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ABSTRACT 
 
Great Britain is regarded as a classic example of the Weberian state, and thus as a model 
of a developed state that might be contrasted with developing states.  However, this 
comfortable fiction conceals the role of empire in the evolution of the British state.  
Rather than take the distinction between a ‘metropolis’ and a ‘periphery’ as given, this 
essay explores the mutual constitution of state and empire.  What it finds is that the 
political identity of the British state changed drastically over the first half of the twentieth 
century, as British intellectuals and policymakers attempted to develop a new political 
community through the British Commonwealth.  The British state of the interwar years 
decentralised its decision-making and embedded itself firmly in new multilateral 
networks.  A rationalised, centralised British state only emerged after the Second World 
War, and that in the context of other (Atlantic and European) political identities.  The 
modern British state, it is concluded, is as much a post-colonial invention as the states of 
the ‘developing’ world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Britain occupies an important place in theories of the state and sovereignty.  From the 
perspective of historical sociology, Britain exemplifies the development of the fiscal-
military state, where clerks and administrators made possible the exploits of British 
military heroes, Marlborough to Wellington, Vernon to Nelson (Brewer, 1989).  From the 
perspective of historical materialism, Britain exemplifies capitalist development, an 
essentially ‘universalising’ world market concealed behind a bureaucratic, centralising 
nation-state (Rosenberg, 1994). 
 
There is general agreement that, by the late eighteenth century, a modern, powerful 
British state had emerged, under the Crown-in-Parliament, forged to make war and 
forged, as a nation, in war (Colley, 2003).  Why this happened, the precise mechanisms 
involved, is a subject of major disagreement.  There have been several attempts at a grand 
synthesis of Weberian (state-via-coercion) and Marxian (state-via-capital) thought.  
Benno Teschke (2003) has dated the revolution in European international relations to 
1688, arguing for a connection between English capital, European wars, and the 
emergence of the state system.  Charles Tilly (1992) has placed state development on two 
axes, capital and coercion, and has posited that the early development of a modern British 
state was founded upon an alliance between the Crown and English burghers and 
merchants.  Michael Mann (1993), in a massive survey, has developed a theory along 
four axes, ideological, economic, military and political.  Other scholars have attempted to 
move away, in novel ways, from Marx and Weber.  Hendrik Spruyt (1994) has suggested 
that modern state development was a process of ‘survival of the fittest,’ in which states, 
eventually, triumphed over city states and city leagues.  John Ruggie (1993) has posited 
that the modern state system emerged as a confluence of logically separate phenomena, 
particularly in the realms of material organisation, social opportunities, and social 
‘epistemes.’ 
 
All of these theories have two characteristics in common: first, they all posit that modern 
state development has followed some kind of ‘trajectory’ of convergence between a 
rationalising state and a nationalising civil society; second, they all contrive to ignore 
empires.  Mann (1993) notes, at the very outset, that he will only address empires 
inasmuch as they affected the state (which was not at all, apparently); Tilly (1992) briefly 
notes that ‘systems change,’ after 1945, brought about the end of empire; Brewer (1989) 
occasionally mentions the East India Company, in connection with administrative and 
fiscal developments in London; Teschke and Ruggie ignore the phenomenon of empire 
entirely.  Spruyt (2005) has written an interesting work on decolonisation, but follows the 
traditional line that empires were convenient (or not) addenda to (fully) developed, 
rational, gain-maximising western states.  If a theory of imperial ‘peripheries’ did not 
exist, clearly, it would be necessary to invent one. 
 
The ‘trajectory’ thesis, the belief in the convergence, in modern states, between the 
government and the governed, lies at the heart of theories of sovereignty, explaining how 
and why modern states establish supremacy over all other authority within a population, 
and how and why they come to recognise that authority in other states (Hinsley, 1986; 
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Bull, 1977).  These two aspects of sovereignty, internal and external, allow ‘empiricists’ 
to treat the relations between national states as the central problem of politics 
(Morgenthau, 1978), and ‘idealists’ to explore the normative and constitutive forces 
comprising ‘sovereignty’ as an abstraction (Beitz, 1991). 
 
It is unsurprising that theorists interested in sovereignty should dismiss or avoid empire: 
empires were untidy things, with little in the way of a neat division between internal and 
external authority.  The very concept of empire makes it difficult to treat sovereignty as 
an indivisible, universal thing and/or idea.  Edward Keene (2002) has noted that, beyond 
the European society of states, ‘the fundamental normative principle of the colonial and 
imperial systems… was that sovereignty should be divided across national and territorial 
borders as required to develop commerce and to promote… good government.’  Divided 
sovereignty has left its legacy: whereas many scholars ‘have consistently misrepresented 
the contemporary practice of dividing sovereignty as an unprecedented, ‘post-modern’ or 
‘post-Westphalian’ phenomenon,’ the tension between a ‘tolerant’ society of states, and a 
‘civilising’ world of empires is as old as modern sovereignty. 
 
This essay will examine the phenomenon of ‘divided’ sovereignty.  However, where 
Keene (2002) seeks to draw a line between practices inside of Europe, that is, where a 
society of states was established, and outside of Europe, that is, the realm of civilising 
empires, this essay will examine the implications of divided sovereignty for the 
metropolitan heart of empire in London.  This essay will argue that the practice of 
dividing sovereignty, in order to run the empire, produced a political and social crisis of 
self-interest in Britain in the mid-twentieth century.  As it became more difficult to 
determine whether the metropolis was pushing, or the imperial periphery pulling, the 
imperial enterprise, the British responded with a radical shift in focus, away from Empire, 
towards Europe and the Atlantic alliance. 
 
The British Empire had a profound effect on British politics.  If sovereignty is a 
restatement of the permanent problem of political authority and obligation within a 
community (Hinsley, 1986), the permanent problem of the British Empire was 
ascertaining whose authority lay in which community.  So far from following a 
rationalising ‘trajectory,’ British sovereignty—legitimacy, political power, decision-
making authority—actually came unravelled during the first half of the twentieth century, 
as the imperial ‘periphery’ sought to control London, and as London developed new ways 
to control her periphery.  Efforts to address the varied legacy of empire have focused 
upon the ‘problem’ of the ‘developing’ world (Jackson, 1990; Bull and Watson, 1984).  
This assumes post-colonial societies entered into an existent (idealised) European society 
of states, rather than the entry of all parties, colonised and coloniser, into a new phase in 
global politics. 
 
This essay will examine the period 1898 to 1962.  It will argue that this period witnessed 
a major contest between ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ forms of sovereignty, as the British 
state was pulled in different directions by competing interests and communities within the 
Empire.  Generally, this debate took place beyond the public view (Darwin, 2005b).  This 
period may be broken into three segments.  Between 1898 and 1919, national sovereignty 
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became a major problem in British politics, as it became clear that British interests were 
not always well-served by the Empire, and as resistance to British power took shape in 
various quarters.  This prompted two experiments in managing nationalism: the British 
Commonwealth and the League of Nations.  Between 1919 and 1945, these two 
experiments pulled British authority in new directions, making it difficult for Britain to 
make ‘autonomous’ decisions as a state.  Between 1945 and 1962, there was a concerted 
effort to reassert British authority in London, culminating in the development of a nuclear 
deterrent through the Anglo-American relationship, and the beginning of an exclusive 
economic relationship with Europe. 
 
This essay will cast doubt upon theories of state development which posit a ‘trajectory’ in 
the development of national-states, while suggesting that the modern state, so far from 
being a creature of the eighteenth century, has continually evolved.  The modern British 
state is a recent invention, as post-colonial in character as the formerly subject peoples of 
the ‘developing’ world. 
 
 
 
POWER AND THE EVOLUTION OF A ‘POLITICAL COMMUNITY,’ 1898-1919 
 
Between 1898 and 1919, the fact that the British Empire was not a political community 
became problematic.  The policy-making elite, in London, responded to this challenge by 
trying to make it into a community.  That is, they attempted to build a broad sense of ‘we-
feeling’ across their empire, in which there was broad identification of mutual self-
interest, and in which mutual attention, communication and responsiveness would 
facilitate common decision-making, to the benefit of all.  This found expression in the 
Commonwealth, and was replicated in the League of Nations.  
 
 
 
Race, Arms and the Boer War 
 
Force is a sine qua non of the modern state; and yet, even as the modern British state took 
shape in the late eighteenth century, British arms multiplied.  By the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, when Benjamin Disraeli insisted that Queen Victoria be made 
‘Empress of India,’ the British Prime Minister was two individuals: the appointed leader 
of a somewhat representative government commanding a powerful navy off the European 
coast, and the autocratic master of a far-flung Asian despotism with an immense standing 
army in the Indian Ocean (Metcalf, 2005).  By 1880, the Indian Army was more than half 
a million men strong, including part of the British Army.  It was a secret army, beyond 
the public eye: its budget was not voted by Parliament, its upkeep did not burden the 
taxpayer, and its utilisation was not subject to the whim of press or popular sentiment.  
This army was Britain’s enforcer, criss-crossing the world throughout the nineteenth 
century to impose imperial power (Robinson and Gallagher, 1981). 
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The British Empire was underwritten by non-British soldiers.  This astonishing fact is 
virtually forgotten today; even Indian nationalists were more worried about Britain’s 
domestic management than about the use of an ‘indigenous’ army for ‘foreign’ 
expeditions (Ambekar and Patwardhan, 1962).  The real heart of British power was the 
Indian Army; yet it was so far beyond the attention of the British nation, or of 
commentators since, that a century of savage global war is still called the pax Britannica. 
 
The Boer War thus came as a rude shock to the British public, making the Empire the 
subject of a new debate.  This was so because the Indian Army did not take part – the 
Boer War was a white man’s war.1  Since white men fought it, they also asked (as Indian 
nationalists, particularly, had been asking for some time), whom did the Empire serve, 
and to what end?  The answer was unclear.  The war revealed a deep quandary between 
forcing ‘civilisation’ upon the Boers, or tolerating their treatment of ‘outlanders;’ this 
posed a seemingly intractable problem of race and nationality, sovereignty and 
administration.  The problem was double-edged: British manhood was also put to the test 
in the war, and Britain’s ability to project power to its farthest frontiers. 
 
The question of strength was racial and political.  It was also moral; Lord Elgin, for 
instance, spoke of ‘the struggle between civilisation and barbarism which is going on 
more or less all over the world’ (Hyam, 1975).  Yet civilisation was imposed by naked 
force upon South Africa; this posed a moral puzzle, potentially undermining the civilising 
argument, and animating a liberal critique of the British Empire. 
 
The liberal critique of empire focused upon domestic, i.e. British, mismanagement, 
particularly in the social conditions of the working classes, an argument most effectively 
put by J.A. Hobson.  In this respect, liberalism vindicated a change in imperial policy 
which was hardly liberal: the South Africa Act of 1909 created a single Union, in which 
the Boers formed the majority.  The racial policies of the Boers, one of the only genuine 
grievances against them, were now applied to the whole country.  While liberalism 
experienced a great triumph in Britain after the war, the British fed a virulent strain of 
Boer irredentism, and inspired two countervailing nationalisms: an Indian movement, led 
by M.K. Gandhi from 1909, and an African movement, led by John Dube from 1912. 
 
 
 
Commonwealth and Empire 
 
The Boer War highlighted the strange fragility of the Empire.  ‘Our two greatest national 
dangers at present,’ Lord Cromer opined, ‘are backwardness in education and unsound 
finance;’ it was necessary to ‘open the way to a better order of things... without in any 
way endangering all that is essential in the policy of modern Imperialism’ (Cromer, 
1903).  The war was just as much a moral problem for conservatives as for liberals, 
revealing a stubbornly inefficient army and a passionately uncomprehending population.  
The army might be reformed; unpredictable popular sentiment, now of a nationalist, now 
                                                 
1
 At least in theory.  More than 10,000 Africans were armed for various purposes (Pakenham, 1979). 
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a socialist character, was more troubling.  Henceforth, the average Briton was an object 
of suspicion, the ‘Continental commitment’ a thing to be avoided (Strachan, 2001). 
 
British statesmen and academics took these problems seriously: the Empire was 
reinvented, a genuine political community was to be created.  As Lionel Curtis, who 
accompanied Alfred Milner to South Afirca, wrote in 1907:  
 
it begins to dawn on one that South Africa is a microcosm and much that we thought 
peculiar to it is equally true of the Empire itself.  We want some clear and coherent 
scheme before men’s minds of what the Empire can and should be (Lavin, 1982). 
 
Cooperation in the common interest became the motivating ideal in Oxford, Chatham 
House, the Round Table, and Whitehall; it gained legal status during the 1907 Colonial 
Conference, when Wilfrid Laurier proposed the title ‘self-governing Dominions’ to 
distinguish Canada, Australia and New Zealand (and eventually Eire and South Africa) 
from the ‘dependent’ empire.  The Committee of Imperial Defence, an informal advisory 
body under Arthur Balfour’s premiership, became an official organ of Commonwealth 
consultation.  This idea was fully expressed in Dominion participation in the Imperial 
War Cabinet during the Great War, and propounded in the writings of a new ‘Oxford’ 
school of imperial historiography that was led by Lionel Curtis from All Souls. 
 
The Commonwealth was a radical reinterpretation of ‘Britishness’ to incorporate a 
multiracial institution, initially Irish, Quebecois and Afrikaner, but later ‘Asiatics’ and 
Africans.  It was never particularly successful in practice, but the expansion of England 
was now justified by the spread of English institutions and the attainment of full 
Dominion status within a free, equal Commonwealth.  From Oxford, the prophets of a 
multi-racial Commonwealth addressed the problems of race and nationality, empire and 
freedom.  The British Commonwealth of Nations (the term received official recognition 
in 1917) was to be an organic unit with a distinct teleology.  Thus would British power be 
preserved in an unified political community. 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth Ideal and the League of Nations 
 
The emerging Commonwealth ideal was a ‘political community,’ bound together by 
common sentiment and shared values.  It was not limited to the Britannic world.  As 
Leonard Woolf (1916) concluded his classic work on international government,  
 
In the British Empire and other loosely federated States, we see the beginnings of another 
system of government, and one to which International Government would necessarily 
approximate. 
 
The British Empire, he added, was solving problems of nationalism and rival interests, 
because it was blurring the line between the independent and dependent Empires. 
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Woolf’s observation highlighted an important connection between the League and the 
British Empire, which becomes more important when we consider that the British peace 
movement made few practical contributions to the League or interwar order (Ceadel, 
2000).  It was people like Robert Cecil or Jan Smuts, supported by academics like 
Charles Webster, Alfred Zimmern and A.F. Pollard, who created the League.  To these 
men, universal peace and imperial peace were the same thing.  As Pollard (1919) 
observed,  
 
the only political system which approached the idea of a League of Nations was the 
British Empire, and it achieved success, not by the amalgamation of independent units, 
but by their decentralization.  
 
These men inhabited a world of Empires, not national states; to Zimmern (1934), the 
League was akin to the British Commonwealth or the Austrian Empire: an invention of 
necessity.  As the empires of the Continent disintegrated, the League, like the 
Commonwealth, was a reinvention of empire, reconciling competing nationalities to 
transnational security, law and arbitration, good government, economic well-being and 
cross-border cooperation (Goldstein, 1991).  If such a view gave moral comfort to 
policymakers such as Robert Cecil, it was also true that they were searching for a means 
of eliminating the troubling distinctions between the imperial metropolis and its diverse 
periphery, and thus regarded the League as a kind of perpetual imperial conference 
(Cecil, 1971).  Jan Smuts (1918) wrote the clearest exposition of these views, arguing the 
League ought to possess the following key characteristics: (a) that ultimate authority 
should rest in the constituent states (as in the Imperial Cabinet), without forcing great 
powers to submit to the small; (b) that trusteeship should be exercised over minor 
constituents (as in Crown Colonies or Protectorates); (c) that trusteeship territories ought 
to be regulated by open-door economics and non-military police (as in Crown Colonies 
or Protectorates). 
 
Surely this was a British corruption of American idealism?  Not in the slightest: it was the 
British who first pressed for a League.  Edward Grey was convinced that a conference 
would have averted the war, and that a permanent conference ought to be maintained 
after the war.  Colonel House, on his first wartime visit to London, wrote Wilson,  
 
There was one thing Grey was fairly insistent upon, and that was that we should come 
into some general guaranty for world-wide peace.  I evaded this by suggesting [a 
convention on] the principles upon which civilized warfare should in the future be 
conducted (Seymour, 1926).   
 
What Grey proposed was the regulation of ius ad bellum; House responded with a 
proposal dealing with ius in bello.  There is a difference, albeit one many League 
historians ignore when pointing to the Hague Convention as though it were parent to the 
League idea.  On 22 September 1915, Grey renewed his suggestion:  
 
the great object of securing the elimination of militarism and navalism is to get security 
for the future against aggressive war... Would the President propose that there should be a 
League of Nations binding themselves to side against any Power which broke a treaty; 
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which broke certain rules of warfare on sea or land... or which refused, in case of dispute, 
to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war? (Seymour, 1926) 
 
Over the next several months, Wilson came round to Grey’s view.  In mid-1916, Wilson 
suggested a joint declaration between Britain and America, based on the 22 September 
letter. 
 
Grey demurred: allies had to be considered, and an Anglo-American declaration would 
not be possible.  Wilson made his declaration, before the League to Enforce Peace, alone.  
To Wilson’s mind, it was necessary for America to enter the war for the right reasons; 
nevertheless, the League was as much a British invention as it was an American.  It had 
more in common with the imperial conferences than the Geneva Convention.  Wilson 
championed the idea, true, but America rejected it, while Britain made it her own.  This 
had nothing to do with peace movements; rather, the League reflected the emerging elite 
consensus that had grown up in Britain in respect of the Commonwealth. 
 
Why didn’t Grey make the joint declaration?  G. Trevelyan (1940) posited a simple 
explanation: that he meant what he said, that he had to consider (as Wilson never 
considered) the views of Russia, France and Italy.  Instead, he encouraged Wilson to 
become the proponent of the idea, perhaps because he thought it would bring America 
into the war, or because he felt that Americans would never accept it unless it were seen 
to emanate from their own shores. 
 
By 1919, British imperialism had changed radically: imperial expansion took place under 
the mandatory system of the League, even as the self-governing Dominions asserted their 
authority in London.  The challenge was to preserve the long-term basis of British power 
while answering liberal and nationalist claims.  The future lay in the political 
communities of the League and the Commonwealth: a new model of ‘enlightened’ self-
interest appeared to have been born. 
 
 
 
INDECISION AND DISAPPOINTMENT, 1919-1945 
 
The Boer War created a crisis in imperial relations.  Yet, liberal and nationalist critiques 
of Empire, so far from prompting statesmen in London to limit themselves to the British 
state, spurred them to cast their ambition still further afield.  London was thrown open as 
never before or since to the statesmen of the British Empire: power and authority were to 
be shared under the Crown, decisions were to serve common interests.  Here was a new 
model of political power, which was explicitly meant to transcend boundaries of state or 
nation.  British sovereignty became indistinct: external recognition of British power came 
to depend upon the Commonwealth, which was difficult to control and even more 
difficult to explain; internal British authority came to depend upon broad multilateral 
negotiation and deal-making, giving peoples on the other side of Earth a say in ‘British’ 
affairs. 
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The interwar years were a high point of British internationalism.  Major policy decisions 
were made with reference to Commonwealth statesmen.  This was reflected by the 
creation of a Dominions Office in 1925, and then the appointment of a Dominions 
Secretary in 1930 (Palmer, 1934).  A reverse colonisation took place: as the Dominions 
gained more constitutional guarantees of their sovereignty, they dispatched their best 
statesmen to London.  Dominion penetration in London was not, and could not be, 
reciprocated.  This became apparent in a series of hard choices – the Ottawa Accords, the 
abdication crisis, policy towards Germany – in which Britain was forced to adopt the 
Commonwealth line.  During the war, the Chiefs of Staff moved away from the 
Commonwealth model, initiating a struggle over the nature of post-war British policy.  
By 1946, concepts like ‘imperial defence’ and a multilateral ideal of Commonwealth 
relations were dead.  Instead, British relations were to be based on bilateralism, which 
represented a reassertion of ‘British’ sovereignty.  In future, interest would come before 
community; Britain would act once more as a free agent. 
 
 
 
Commonwealth Evolution 
 
Constitutionally, the interwar British Empire became difficult to explain or predict, with 
no clear lines for collective decision-making.  This was a cause of much official 
smugness: ‘it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political 
organization,’ according to the 1926 Inter-Imperial Relations Committee (Cronkite, 
1938).  In the same year, Alfred Zimmern (1934) described the Commonwealth as a 
British Entente, each state having full control over its policy but bound to the whole by 
cordial feelings.  It was averred, in London and the Dominions, that Commonwealth 
unity and state autonomy were reconcilable, just so long as nobody thought too hard 
about it (Long, 1937).  The Dominions enjoyed liberty under the law of the King, who 
moreover symbolized the ultimate sovereignty of Britain and embodied, for many, the 
sentimental bonds of King and Country (Zimmern, 1934). 
 
Legally, Dominion sovereignty was established by the end of the 1920s.  In the Chanak 
crisis of 1923, the Dominions condemned Lloyd George for risking war with Turkey, 
publicly refuting his claim to lead the Empire.  A fuller guarantee of Dominion 
sovereignty was provided by the Statute of Westminster, by which ‘no law and no 
provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a 
Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of 
England’ (Statute of Westminster, 1931).  The Dominions were effectively sovereign, 
though New Zealand did not bother to ratify the Statute until 1947. 
 
If the British Empire was a license for the Dominions to continually involve themselves 
in the affairs of London, the Statute of Westminster barred London from doing the same 
in Ottawa or Canberra.  Throughout the 1930s, the capacity of the Dominions to so 
involve themselves developed rapidly, as the Dominions each opened their own 
Department of External Affairs (New Zealand was the last to do so, in 1942), opened 
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consulates, appointed ministers and exchanged High Commissioners.  The Governors 
General now represented what the King represented: a symbolic head of state. 
 
In 1937, New Zealand’s premier, M.J. Savage, averred that ‘we have found no 
difficulties, and expect to find no difficulties, in conducting the affairs of our Dominion 
with complete freedom’ (Cmd. 5482, 1937).  It was otherwise for Britain. 
 
 
 
Hard Choices: Ottawa and Abdication 
 
The economic and political environment of the 1930s placed a tremendous strain upon 
Britain, forcing her to rely upon the Commonwealth.  During the Ottawa Conference and 
the abdication crisis, the Dominions were able to drive the pace of British policy on 
issues, Sterling and the Crown, at the heart of British sovereignty. 
 
The Ottawa Conference, in 1932, followed close on the heels of the Statute of 
Westminster.  Already, British statesmen dreamt of the day when scientific development 
in West African colonies would pay off Britain’s debt (Hancock, 1940).  By 1925, 
economic parity was achieved with 1913, and tariff barriers went down, but structural 
problems ran deep.  British goods became less competitive, British finance more 
conservative, there were large American debts, there weren’t large wells of ‘invisible’ 
assets in shipping or insurance to cushion trade deficits (Cain and Hopkins, 1993).  The 
buoyancy of the British economy in such trying times depended upon Sterling; Sterling 
depended upon circulation and reserve throughout the Empire-Commonwealth.  The 
Dominions thus possessed extraordinary leverage over British economic policy 
(Drummond, 1972).  The Dominions wanted to open British markets: Britain’s desire to 
preserve Sterling as a trading/reserve currency overrode her desire to protect domestic 
producers or maintain other, more efficient, trade partners.  These were the conditions 
under which the Commonwealth met at Ottawa. 
 
In fact, Canada did leave Sterling, but still participated in the Ottawa Conference 
(Holland, 1983).  Fierce competition took place in a cooperative setting.  This produced 
contradictory results.  The New Zealand delegation, for instance, arrived presuming 
British benevolence would equal British concessions (Capie, 1978).  Britain was 
desperate for the negotiations to succeed: it was rumoured Stanley Baldwin told his 
delegation to take whatever they could get (Drummond, 1972).  Australia and New 
Zealand threatened walkouts over Argentine beef; South Africa settled for the 
maintenance of the status quo; Canada imposed a last-minute duty on British steel plate 
which nearly caused a British walkout; Eire was already engaged in an economic ‘war’ 
with Britain, and so (ironically) passed an opportunity to damage Britain’s position.  
Britain’s trade deficit worsened: British markets were forced open, British exports 
suffered as retaliatory measures were taken outside the Commonwealth (Cain and 
Hopkins, 1993).  Ottawa reversed the Marxian view of metropolis-periphery: it was 
Britain that was thoroughly penetrated by the Empire. 
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The British preserved Sterling, but left a lot of blood on the floor at ‘Rottawa,’ as 
Churchill called it (Amery, 1988).  Ottawa demonstrated the peril of treating sovereign 
states as friends.  Sentiment and imperial unity did not go hand in hand with hard 
bargaining (Rooth, 1986).  Indeed, as the abdication crisis demonstrated, the sentiment of 
faraway lands was a hard master.  The crisis was sparked by North American press 
coverage of the affair between the King and Mrs. Simpson.  Mackenzie King, the 
Canadian Premier, privately apprised Stanley Baldwin of the danger that the affair posed 
to imperial sentiment (Mansergh, 1952).  Stanley Bruce, the Australian High 
Commissioner, persuaded Baldwin to act (Edwards, 1980). 
 
The first question was sentimental: did the Dominions prefer abdication in favour of the 
Duke of York, or a morganatic marriage?  As the South African premier, General 
Herzog, said: ‘the one would be a great shock, the other would be a permanent wound’ 
(Mansergh, 1952).  The other Dominions concurred on this point, which overrode British 
preference for a morganatic marriage. 
 
The second question was legal, and demonstrated the capacity of the Dominions to 
change the nature of the Commonwealth through independent political action.  Every 
Dominion which had ratified the Statute of Westminster also had to approve the 
abdication of the King.  For Australia, New Zealand and Canada, which were included in 
the Declaration of Abdication Act of the Westminster Parliament, this did not present a 
problem.  South Africa refused to be included in the action of the Westminster 
Parliament, and so dated the abdication from the demise of the King, on 11 December, 
rather than on 10 December, which was when the Act was passed (Bailey, 1938).  The 
Irish approach was more radical still, seizing the opportunity provided by the abdication 
to give ‘external association’ a clear position in Irish law.  The King’s authority was 
subjugated to the Executive Council, while diplomatic representation and international 
agreements became the sole domain of the Council.  The Executive Authority (External 
Relations) Act (1936) came into effect on 12 December, meaning that the King reigned 
an extra day in Ireland.  If the Dominions were content to remain ‘free and equal’ nations 
under the sovereignty of the King, that sovereignty had become very thin indeed by the 
beginning of 1937. 
 
 
 
More Hard Choices: War and Defence 
 
As British sovereignty became divided between the Dominions, so her capacity to 
respond to the European balance of power also became divided, allowing faraway 
peoples a direct say on questions of vital and immediate importance.  Britain officially 
identified Germany as a major threat in 1935, when Neville Chamberlain initiated 
rearmament (Peden, 1979).  Despite Chamberlain’s public identification of the threat of 
Nazism (Feiling, 1946), and his argument that Hitler was the ‘bully’ of Europe (Macleod, 
1961), his reputation has never recovered from ‘appeasement.’  One reason is that 
onetime supporters like E.H. Carr found it convenient to repudiate him; another is that the 
diplomatic constraints imposed by the Commonwealth are often ignored. 
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The Commonwealth wavered prior to 1939.  The common ‘milieu’ goals of the 
Commonwealth (international law, prosperity, etc.) concealed deep divisions of interest 
and priority (Round Table, 1938).  Had war come in 1938, Lord Halifax was convinced 
that South Africa would have remained neutral; that there would have remained strong 
opposition to war in Australia; and that the attitude of Canada would have been uncertain 
(Birkenhead, 1965).  This was a critical problem: Britain identified herself as the British 
Empire, but was unable to tell whether the Empire would support her in war. 
 
The Imperial Conference of 1937 made it apparent that the Dominions were not happy to 
prepare for another war, let alone wage one.  The Dominions insisted upon their 
parliamentary right to decide; while Britain might subscribe to the League of Nations, the 
Dominions, rather like the USA, remained aloof (Hodson, 1939).  The conference was a 
brutal demonstration of the limits of Commonwealth cooperation: each Dominion had a 
good reason to avoid standing behind Britain.  Mackenzie King cited secessionist fears in 
the Canadian plains and in Quebec; Hertzog insensibly compared Versailles to 
Vereeniging; M.J. Savage suggested giving the League some real ‘teeth;’ the Australians 
cited their concern over Japan (Ovendale, 1975).  The conference concluded with a lame 
statement of faith in the capacity of nations of all creeds to cooperate (Cmd. 5482, 1937). 
 
Britain could not contemplate waging a major war without the vast material and 
manpower resources of the Dominions.  Yet, as Sir Harry Batterbee wrote, Dominion 
attitudes were 
 
hopelessly inconsistent: they blame us for not being prepared to stand up for democratic 
principles but are not ready to commit themselves in any way to come to our help if we 
get into trouble as a result of standing up to the dictator powers (Batterbee, 1938). 
 
British policy was bound to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth had demanded 
peace at any price.  As Anthony Eden observed, it was 
 
clear that the Dominions were isolationist and there would be no sense in fighting a war 
which would break the British Empire while trying to secure the safety of the United 
Kingdom (Watt, 1965).   
 
Even the annexation of Czechoslovakia failed to provoke any response from the 
Dominions: Neville Chamberlain risked the disintegration of the Empire when he 
declared war.  Canada nearly broke: Ernest Lapointe, the external affairs minister, made 
an unprecedented intervention in provincial politics to defeat secessionists in Quebec 
(Rumilly, 1973).  So too South Africa: Jan Smuts became premier because the Governor 
General refused to call an election, but nationalist revolt was a possibility (Nicholls, 
1961).  None of the Dominions offered immediately to dispatch an expeditionary force, 
but once the Dominions had cast their lot with Britain, they found their publics demanded 
further action. 
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British Post-Hostilities Planning: A Return to Sovereignty? 
 
The Second World War framed the experiments of the interwar years in a sinister light.  
The interwar Commonwealth had privileged legitimacy over pragmatism, imposing  
inconvenient multilateral constraints on policy-making; changes had to be made.  The 
Chiefs of Staff demanded the ability to plan realistically for the post-war era, that is, to 
assume that Russia would be relatively hostile, and that the post-war world would consist 
of competing power blocs.  In this sort of world, the Chiefs of Staff derived their model 
of cooperation from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in Washington: a bilateral special 
relationship between the United States and the British Empire, combining the unbounded 
industrial strength of the one with the unlimited real estate of the other (Lewis, 2003). 
 
The ‘realism’ of the Chiefs of Staff was tempered by the understanding in the Foreign 
Office that substantial components of ‘British’ power, especially in new military 
technologies like aviation, resided in the Commonwealth: it was unlikely that India or 
Australia would continue to contribute their military manpower to an exclusive Anglo-
American concern (Report of a meeting at Balliol, 1942).
2
  This presented a conundrum: 
to maintain Anglo-American cooperation on grounds of equality, Commonwealth 
cooperation had to continue. 
 
One way of making this work was to integrate Commonwealth power into a more general 
framework.  This consideration informed the ‘Four Power Plan’ (WP(42)516, 1942).  In 
this plan, a general settlement (i.e. the United Nations) aimed to preserve engagement of 
the great powers in global order and security.  If such a plan succeeded, so much the 
better; if it failed, it would leave Britain, America and the Commonwealth committed to 
one another under the distinctly unsuspicious banner of world unity.  In substance, this 
was the Commonwealth or League ideal of the interwar years; in form, it was no longer 
‘Britannic.’ 
 
Pressure from Ernest Bevin forced the Chiefs of Staff to acquiesce to the diplomatic 
worldview.  Privately, the Chiefs of Staff simply altered their rules of secrecy in order to 
continue to plan as they wanted, without the interference of the Foreign Office or 
busybody ministers (COS13(44)346, 1944).  For the benefit of the Cabinet, the Chiefs of 
Staff recognised that the emergence of a general settlement would probably involve 
America and the Dominions in global geopolitics and thus provide a foundation for 
greater cooperation with Britain (JP(44)87, 1944).  When the general settlement failed, 
the Chiefs of Staff would be ready, and America and the Dominions would move even 
closer. 
 
During the war, British thinking became more instrumental.  Interest had to precede 
community: it was no good appealing to some airy attachment to the Union flag.  
Moreover, the great imperial periphery of the interwar years, which had been Britain’s 
margin of security, ceased to be great: aviation and the atomic bomb made it a small 
place indeed, making the consolidation of British policy more necessary than ever. 
                                                 
2
 Balliol was where the Foreign Research and Press Service was located.  Its staff included Arnold 
Toynbee, Lionel Curtis, and Alfred Zimmern. 
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DECOLONISATION, POLARIS AND EUROPE, 1945-1962 
 
While recent studies have emphasised revival in post-war British imperial politics 
(Martel, 2000), the fact remains that after the war the direction of the imperial project 
changed radically, as the imperial metropolis forcibly asserted itself.  A new politics of 
pragmatism, associated with Harold Macmillan and Malcolm MacDonald rather than 
Winston Churchill and Robert Cecil, dictated that the Empire either serve Britain, or be 
cut loose.  In many places, the result was administrative centralisation and purposeful 
economic development; but many other places were cut loose, in a businesslike process 
that became progressive as the British state adapted to post-war realities. 
 
This businesslike attitude was itself indicative of deep-seated changes in the order of 
British priorities.  There can be no doubt, as Roger Louis (1977) has demonstrated, that 
the British fought the war to defend or even extend the Empire.  To many observers – and 
certainly to critical Americans – there was an astonishing continuity in British policy: the 
economic potential of the Empire was to be realised through scientific development, the 
strategic potential realised through rationalisation.  Yet there was a vital difference: as 
Taylor (1992) argued, ‘the British did not relinquish their Empire by accident.  They 
ceased to believe in it.’ 
 
A new strain of British scepticism – one which ran far beyond the Chiefs of Staff – 
revealed itself almost immediately, as Commonwealth cooperation shifted from a 
multilateral to a bilateral model.  During the interwar years, British policymakers had 
been desperate to ensure that imperial conferences created a facade of imperial unity; in 
the Dominion Premiers’ Meeting of 1946, nobody minded that the Australian premier, 
Benjamin Chifley, had departed by the time the Canadian premier, Mackenzie King, 
arrived.  The meeting was a running series of consultations: Britain negotiated 
agreements separately with each player.  Australia and New Zealand, for instance, agreed 
to support Britain publicly in the South Pacific, and to help maintain order in the 
shattered Japanese periphery.  Canada, by contrast, agreed to support Britain privately, 
particularly in defence liaison and the standardisation of equipment (an agreement which 
established the standardisation framework for the North Atlantic alliance), but also in 
atomic research.  The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was the architect of this new 
framework for imperial relations: each country in the British Empire would be dealt with 
in its particular regional political and economic context.
3
  Imperial unity, with all that 
implied for a common British identity around the world, was replaced with overlapping 
‘defence areas,’ each serving specific purposes within the context of a British world 
system. 
                                                 
3
 It may be observed that Bevin’s position as Foreign Secretary was significant for two reasons: his policy 
brought the Foreign Office closer to the Chiefs of Staff than hitherto; and his policy emerged out of a long 
apprenticeship in a range of important interdepartmental committees, where he worked closely with men, 
like Lionel Curtis or Arnold Toynbee, who had shaped the interwar Commonwealth.  Both facts suggest 
that Bevin’s position reflected a subtle yet important shift in the elite consensus about Empire. 
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The purpose of that system more generally became increasingly vague.  British defence 
planning for an independent India, for instance, had sensibly anticipated that the politics 
of the Indian Ocean littoral, the proximity of Russia and China, as well as the possibility 
of partition, would ensure that India continued to cooperate closely with Britain in 
defence matters.  Yet the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism and the beginnings of 
apartheid on one side of that littoral, coupled with the birth and spread of the non-aligned 
movement on the other, destroyed any presumptive unity that Britain might have 
maintained across the Indian Ocean.  The administrative logic of the Commonwealth 
broke down as the old Dominion ‘circulars’ ceased to circulate: states like Australia and 
Canada continued to receive high-grade information from London, others like South 
Africa were given limited information, while suspect or dysfunctional states like India 
and Pakistan were sent anodyne summaries.  As the logic of British imperialism became 
more instrumental, Commonwealth relations became ‘external’ rather than ‘internal.’ 
 
This did not mean that imperial thinking ground to a halt; but the relationship between 
Britain and the Empire had changed, placing the interests and prerogatives of the former 
at the heart of decision-making.  John Darwin (2005a) has raised the prospect of a 
‘fourth’ British Empire in the immediate post-war decades, organised around an 
independent nuclear deterrent, strategic bases in the Middle East, and the position of 
sterling as fortified by imperial preference and the development of the export capacity of 
the colonial Empire in Africa and Southeast Asia.  Nevertheless, the loss of India 
deprived the Empire of its principle enforcers; the cost of imperial defence now fell 
directly upon the British taxpayer, making the choice between imperial ventures and 
social spending more immediate.  In this environment, cooperation with America or with 
Europe each offered potential advantages that had to be weighed, coolly, beside those of 
Commonwealth cooperation. 
 
The speed and clarity of this transformation may be exaggerated easily.  The Suez Crisis 
is a particularly good example of the danger: a brief incident which prompted a few 
resignations has assumed a tremendous retrospective significance as harbinger of deep 
and long-lasting changes, which were not yet deep enough to prompt British entry into 
the Common Market in 1957, nor yet long-lasting enough to preclude British military 
action in Jordan in 1958, Kuwait in 1961, or Aden in 1964 (Petersen, 2000).  What did 
mark a decisive shift in the logic of British imperialism was what accompanied these 
crises and interventions: a persistent, penetrating, and quite often pitiless effort to 
apprehend the reasons for the British Empire and British statecraft.  Just as the fear of 
decline at the beginning of the twentieth century spurred the British to reinvent their 
identity in the Empire, so now the fear of decline fifty years later spurred them to tear that 
vision apart, and to reinvent their identity apart from the Empire (Beck, 2006). 
 
In this context, two transformations were particularly relevant.  One was the decision to 
enter Europe, which reflected a radical shift in focus between 1957 and 1962.  The 1962 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference was a last-ditch effort, spearheaded by 
Australia, to preserve the system of imperial preference which had been negotiated at 
Ottawa in 1932.  This was a failure; Macmillan was determined to enter the European 
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Economic Community, and between 1962 and 1968, Britain dismantled the system of 
imperial trade, particularly as the maintenance of the Commonwealth system was 
perceived as one of the chief impediments to British accession to Europe (Ward, 2001). 
 
The second was Anglo-American technology-sharing arrangements.  After 1945, the 
Commonwealth had lain at the heart of British research and development (Reynolds, 
2000).  In 1960, Macmillan ended Britain’s Bluestreak program, on the back of American 
willingness to sell Britain Skybolt missiles.  When Skybolt was precipitously cancelled, 
Britain negotiated the purchase, under exceptional terms, of Polaris missiles.  A credible 
sea-launched ballistic missile capability provided Britain with the strategic depth that the 
Empire was supposed to provide, without having to rely on optimistic appraisals (or 
outright deception) and good fortune in counter-insurgency (JP(56)10, 1956).  It may be 
true, as D.A. Reynolds claims, that this meant a jarring shift towards submarines, and 
highlighted British dependence on American nuclear technology (Reynolds, 1991), but it 
alleviated Britain’s dependence on Commonwealth research and liberated Britain from 
‘strategic’ bases whose value was always more apparent than real.  
 
The end of the British ‘imperial’ perspective in policymaking took place in 1968, when 
the Colonial Office was wrapped into the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office became a division of the Foreign Office.  The loss of 
the Colonial Office was particularly significant, since it had more or less singlehandedly 
preserved the ethos of a special British imperial mission.  Between 1930 and 1947, there 
had been four important ministers responsible for the conduct of various sorts of British 
foreign policy.  Now, there was one.  Consolidation meant that, by 1968, the congruence 
between external and internal characteristics of British sovereignty was stronger than 
ever before. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This essay supports two of Stephen Krasner’s (1993; 1999) arguments.  First, sovereignty 
was and is a response to given political problems, thus continues to evolve.  Second, 
states jettison ‘logics of appropriateness’ in the pursuit of material self-interest.  
However, in contrast to Krasner, this essay has demonstrated that ‘legitimating 
rationales’ may, in fact, precede the organisation of practical solutions to political 
problems.  The Commonwealth and the League were deployed to meet a range of 
pressing, fundamentally material, problems, closely related to the changing needs of 
British power in world affairs.  Yet both were invented as a legitimating rationale prior to 
deployment as pragmatic solutions, because, as a pragmatic solution, they depended upon 
the consent of constituent elements, demanding that statesmen have a rational expectation 
that their interests would be recognised and advanced. 
 
The peculiar history of the Commonwealth is a perfect example of one of the ‘secret 
histories’ of the modern state that Justin Rosenberg (1994) has highlighted.  The 
projection of the post-imperial state, western or otherwise, backwards into history reflects 
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a failure of the historical imagination, which also happens to serve the demand of a 
totalising institution for teleological certainty.  The reverse colonisation of Britain during 
the first half of the twentieth century suggests that the modern state was a process of co-
evolution; Manichean distinctions between an imperial ‘metropolis’ and colonised 
‘periphery’ serve merely to shove the ‘periphery’ out of the picture, and to endow the 
‘metropolis’ with a wholly false patina of respectability.  Perhaps the problem with 
theories of state development, Marxian or Weberian, is that they remain fundamentally 
Cartesian, rooted in rationalistic monism no matter how many axes they deploy.  If we 
are to grasp how states constituted one another through colonialism, nationalism and 
revolt, it might be more appropriate to begin with the existential aphorism, ‘je me révolte, 
donc nous sommes’ (Camus, 1951).  This would allow us to move away from a gloomy 
(chauvinistic) narrative of post-war decline for states such as Britain, as well as to avoid 
the practice (also chauvinistic) of equating modernisation with imagined western norms 
of ‘development.’  As Keene (2002) has argued, ‘the starting-point for understanding 
what kind of world order we have today, and what the possibilities are for the future, is to 
understand the bifurcated, contradictory and discriminatory nature of international order 
in the past.’ 
 
Under such conditions, it is questionable whether any ‘general’ theory of state formation 
is desirable, let alone possible.  The complicated phenomenon of the British state, 
constituted as it was in its relations with the British Empire, falsified the Marxist model 
of capital accumulation at Ottawa, and the Weberian model of war-making in 
Chamberlain’s appeasement; it refuses to follow or establish any particular model of 
‘sovereignty.’  That is precisely why the phenomenon, for all its eccentricities, is too 
important to ignore. 
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